Frost Law
“Article III of the Constitution assigns to the Federal Judiciary the responsibility and power to adjudicate ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’ . . . ‘[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is’ . . . Chevron is overruled.”1 In a mere thirty-five pages, Chief Justice John Roberts has changed the landscape of administrative law for decades to come. Gone are the days of judicial deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. Moving forward, the courts will be responsible for clearing up the ambiguities that Congress leaves in the laws.
Chevron2 itself was a relatively unremarkable case that dealt with clean air regulations and whether the determinations of the Environmental Protection Agency were permissible under the then existing law and regulatory framework. As the Chief Justice remarked in last month’s landmark decision, the Court, at the time Chevron was released, did not appear to apprehend the enormity of the decision and the role it would play in the decades to come.
Chevron established a general two-step analysis for agency interpretations of statutes. At the first step a court reviewing agency action was to determine if the law in question had ambiguities. If the law did not, then the judge was to apply the law and decide if the agency’s action fell within the bounds of the statutory text. If there were ambiguities, then the court would move to step two. At step two, the judge was to determine if the agency’s interpretation of the law is a permissible one, and if so, the court was required to accept the interpretation of the agency even if it were not the interpretation the court thought best. In this way, the agency was said to receive deference in its interpretation of ambiguous statutes.
Utilizing this judicial doctrine, agencies across the federal government have been able to mold the law to advance the executive administration’s policy goals. Supporters of Chevron and its progeny argued that agencies were best equipped to interpret statutes in light of their expertise in their respective fields. This notion now appears to have run its course.
Chief Justice John Roberts authored the opinion for the Court. In the opinion, he walks the reader through the history of the Chevron doctrine and of administrative law in the United States, generally. He argues that it was always a faulty premise that agencies had some heightened ability to interpret the statutes that delineate the bounds of their power. In addition, a blanket renunciation of the Court’s authority to interpret the law in the best way possible is antithetical to our system of government.
He argues that the courts, and not executive agencies, are the place to interpret statutes:
The very point of the traditional tools of statutory construction—the tools courts use every day—is to resolve statutory ambiguities. That is no less true when the ambiguity is about the scope of an agency’s own power—perhaps the occasion on which abdication in favor of the agency is least appropriate.3
It became clear to the Court that the defense of the Chevron doctrine had no backing in the Constitution and no support under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). The APA vests the power to interpret legal issues in the courts and does not provide for blanket deference to federal agencies.4 If anything, courts should not provide more deference to agencies then the standard articulated in Skidmore v. Swift & Co. There the Court famously said that a reviewing court should examine the agencies interpretation and give it weight upon consideration of “. . . the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”5
The Court explicitly said that this sea change in administrative law is not a call to bring into question the almost countless cases decided under its rubric. In other words, those cases still represent good precedent. Moving forward, cases involving agencies will not get special treatment and agencies will have to convince federal judges across the country that their interpretations are the correct ones. Congress can also help by making laws more clearly tailored to what agencies are and are not empowered to do. Congress may additionally allow for deference to agencies explicitly in their statutes, subject only to constraints otherwise contemplated by the Constitution.
It is important to recognize that not much is likely to change in how laws are interpreted. Courts even before this decision could simply apply the Chevron two-step analysis in a way that would lead to the decision they wanted to reach. If a court agreed with the agency, it could simply claim that the law was ambiguous and then find the agency’s interpretation to be permissible. If it disagreed with the agency, a court could claim the law was not ambiguous and that the statue’s clear meaning was whatever the court happened to claim it was. The Chief Justice pointed out in his opinion that the fact that courts across the country have played fast and loose with the analysis required by Chevron was yet another reason why the Court found it to be an unworkable system.6
“Chevron is overruled.”7 While those three words have sparked a lot of commotion both inside and outside legal spheres, the final impact of this decision may be quite limited; however, only time, and future cases, will reveal the true magnitude of this decision. In time Congress, executive agencies, and individuals will learn the limitations of this decision and how best to function with it. Individuals and the courts will now more easily be able to rein in overreaching agency conduct. If you have any questions or concerns about this ruling call us at (410) 497-5947 or schedule a call with our team.
“Article III of the Constitution assigns to the Federal Judiciary the responsibility and power to adjudicate ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’ . . . ‘[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is’ . . . Chevron is overruled.”1 In a mere thirty-five pages, Chief Justice John Roberts has changed the landscape of administrative law for decades to come. Gone are the days of judicial deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. Moving forward, the courts will be responsible for clearing up the ambiguities that Congress leaves in the laws.
Chevron2 itself was a relatively unremarkable case that dealt with clean air regulations and whether the determinations of the Environmental Protection Agency were permissible under the then existing law and regulatory framework. As the Chief Justice remarked in last month’s landmark decision, the Court, at the time Chevron was released, did not appear to apprehend the enormity of the decision and the role it would play in the decades to come.
Chevron established a general two-step analysis for agency interpretations of statutes. At the first step a court reviewing agency action was to determine if the law in question had ambiguities. If the law did not, then the judge was to apply the law and decide if the agency’s action fell within the bounds of the statutory text. If there were ambiguities, then the court would move to step two. At step two, the judge was to determine if the agency’s interpretation of the law is a permissible one, and if so, the court was required to accept the interpretation of the agency even if it were not the interpretation the court thought best. In this way, the agency was said to receive deference in its interpretation of ambiguous statutes.
Utilizing this judicial doctrine, agencies across the federal government have been able to mold the law to advance the executive administration’s policy goals. Supporters of Chevron and its progeny argued that agencies were best equipped to interpret statutes in light of their expertise in their respective fields. This notion now appears to have run its course.
Chief Justice John Roberts authored the opinion for the Court. In the opinion, he walks the reader through the history of the Chevron doctrine and of administrative law in the United States, generally. He argues that it was always a faulty premise that agencies had some heightened ability to interpret the statutes that delineate the bounds of their power. In addition, a blanket renunciation of the Court’s authority to interpret the law in the best way possible is antithetical to our system of government.
He argues that the courts, and not executive agencies, are the place to interpret statutes:
The very point of the traditional tools of statutory construction—the tools courts use every day—is to resolve statutory ambiguities. That is no less true when the ambiguity is about the scope of an agency’s own power—perhaps the occasion on which abdication in favor of the agency is least appropriate.3
It became clear to the Court that the defense of the Chevron doctrine had no backing in the Constitution and no support under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). The APA vests the power to interpret legal issues in the courts and does not provide for blanket deference to federal agencies.4 If anything, courts should not provide more deference to agencies then the standard articulated in Skidmore v. Swift & Co. There the Court famously said that a reviewing court should examine the agencies interpretation and give it weight upon consideration of “. . . the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”5
The Court explicitly said that this sea change in administrative law is not a call to bring into question the almost countless cases decided under its rubric. In other words, those cases still represent good precedent. Moving forward, cases involving agencies will not get special treatment and agencies will have to convince federal judges across the country that their interpretations are the correct ones. Congress can also help by making laws more clearly tailored to what agencies are and are not empowered to do. Congress may additionally allow for deference to agencies explicitly in their statutes, subject only to constraints otherwise contemplated by the Constitution.
It is important to recognize that not much is likely to change in how laws are interpreted. Courts even before this decision could simply apply the Chevron two-step analysis in a way that would lead to the decision they wanted to reach. If a court agreed with the agency, it could simply claim that the law was ambiguous and then find the agency’s interpretation to be permissible. If it disagreed with the agency, a court could claim the law was not ambiguous and that the statue’s clear meaning was whatever the court happened to claim it was. The Chief Justice pointed out in his opinion that the fact that courts across the country have played fast and loose with the analysis required by Chevron was yet another reason why the Court found it to be an unworkable system.6
“Chevron is overruled.”7 While those three words have sparked a lot of commotion both inside and outside legal spheres, the final impact of this decision may be quite limited; however, only time, and future cases, will reveal the true magnitude of this decision. In time Congress, executive agencies, and individuals will learn the limitations of this decision and how best to function with it. Individuals and the courts will now more easily be able to rein in overreaching agency conduct. If you have any questions or concerns about this ruling call us at (410) 497-5947 or schedule a call with our team.
